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Abstract
We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with price competition and with social
marginal cost differing from private marginal costs. We find that any equilibrium timing patterns–
Bertrand, Stackelberg with private leadership, Stackelberg with public leadership, and multiple
Stackelberg equilibria– emerge. When the foreign ownership share in a private firm is less than 50%,
public leadership more likely emerges than private leadership. Conversely, private leadership can
emerge in a unique equilibrium when the foreign ownership share in a private firm is large. These
results may explain recent policy changes in public financial institutions in Japan. We also find a
nonmonotone relationship between the welfare advantage of public and private leadership and the
difference between social and private marginal costs for a private firm. A nonmonotone relationship
does not emerge in profit ranking.
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1 Introduction
In Japan, during the post-war reconstruction and high-growth periods from 1945 to the 1970s, state-
owned public enterprises—especially public financial institutions—played a leading role in the Japanese
economy. It was widely believed that lending by public financial institutions (such as the Development
Bank of Japan) had a pump-priming effect on the lending by private banks. Japan Post was the
world largest bank in 1970s and 1980s.1 Since the 1980s, some public enterprises have undergone
major reforms. For example, three major nonfinancial, state-owned public enterprises—the Japan
Railway group, Japan Tobacco Incorporated, and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation—were
privatized. In addition, the Japanese flag carrier (Japan Airline) was privatized in 1987. However, the
government continued to hold major public financial institutions, and these played dominant roles in
the Japanese financial market.
The Koizumi Cabinet (April 2001–September 2006) changed all this, declaring that public financial
institutions should play a secondary role to private firms, with private firms leading the market. As a
result, there was significant downscaling of the major public institutions. Once again, however, public
institutions have begun to lead in Japanese markets (Matsumura and Ogawa, 2017b). Newly established
public financial institutions such as the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan, the Enterprise
Turnaround Initiative Corporation of Japan, the Regional Economy Vitalization Corporation of Japan,
and the Private Finance Initiative Promotion Corporation of Japan play leading roles in current financial
markets. The Nikkei, a Japanese newspaper, refers to this phenomenon as“Kiko Capitalism (State
Institution Capitalism)” (Nikkei, November 22, 2011). This type of capitalism is still expanding under
the current Abe Cabinet (Nikkei, October 8, 2013). For example, the government has tried to establish
new public financial institutions, such as the Japan Investment Corporation.2
The topic of whether public or private firms should lead markets and how this affects market
1See Horiuchi and Sui (1993). It has been observed that, globally, public sectors play an important role in lending
markets. See Bose et al. (2014).
2This is not limited to Japan. For example, Korea Development Bank plays an important role in Korean industry
financing and recently supplied money to rescue Hanjin Heavy Industries (Nikkei, February 13, 2019). In Indonesia, the
state-owned bank, Bank Mandiri, are expanding by acquisition of a privately-owned Permata Bank (NNA Asia, April
10,2019).
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equilibrium has been actively discussed in the literature on mixed oligopolies.3 Pal (1998) adopted the
observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and investigated the endogenous
role in which public and private firms compete in mixed oligopolies. He showed that public firms
should be the followers in welfare and should also become the followers in equilibrium. The literature
on endogenous roles in mixed oligopolies is rich and diverse. Matsumura (2003) introduced foreign
competition, showing that public firms should be the leaders and that they become the leaders in
equilibrium. Nakamura and Inoue (2007) introduced managerial delegation and showed that public firms
become the followers. Matsumura and Ogawa (2010) adopted Matsumura’s (1998) partial privatization
approach and showed that under partial privatization, private leadership is a unique equilibrium or is
risk dominant unless the degree of privatization is large.4 Capuano and De Feo (2010) introduced the
shadow cost of public funds and showed that private leadership equilibrium is robust. Tomaru and Saito
(2010) considered a subsidized, mixed duopoly and showed that private leadership emerges under an
optimal subsidy policy. Amir and De Feo (2014) provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public
and/or private leadership equilibrium under quite general demand and cost conditions. Matsumura and
Ogawa (2017a) and Lee and Xu (2018) introduced an environmental problem and showed that the degree
of negative externality affects equilibrium roles in mixed duopolies. Matsumura and Ogawa (2017b)
introduced product differentiation and showed that public leadership can be risk dominant, although
it is worse for welfare than private leadership.5
All the papers on endogenous roles in mixed oligopolies mentioned above investigated quantity
competition. Until the 1990s, it was difficult to raise funds. In this situation—based on Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) and Friedman (1988)— it would be reasonable to use quantity competition models to
analyze the Japanese financial market. Since March of 2001, however, Japanese financial markets have
been loosened considerably in response to quantitative monetary-easing policy, and similar situations
have prevailed globally. Thus, price competition models may be more appropriate for analyzing the
3Recent developments in mixed oligopolies, see Pal and Saha (2014), Amerighi and De Feo (2017), Lin and Matsumura
(2018), Escrihuela-Villar and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2019), Klumpp and Su (2019) and works cited therein.
4For more on the concept of risk dominance, see Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
5For the importance of sequential-move games in mixed oligopolies, see Fjell and Heywood (2004), Heywood and Ye
(2009a), Ino and Matsumura (2010), Wang and Mukherjee (2012), Gelves and Heywood (2013), and Wang and Lee (2013).
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role of public institutions in current financial markets. Moreover, in mixed oligopolies—as Matsumura
and Ogawa (2012), Haraguchi and Matsumura (2014), and Din and Sun (2016) have shown— price
competition is more natural than quantity competition in endogenous competition structure models.6
Thus, it is important to investigate endogenous roles in the price competition model.
The literature on endogenous timing with price competition in mixed oligopolies is relatively sparse.
Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) investigated price competition and showed that Bertrand emerges in a mixed
duopoly as a unique equilibrium, and Din and Sun (2016) showed that his result holds even when the
competition structure is endogenized.7
In this study, we extend the model of Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) in two directions. One direction is
introducing a foreign-ownership share in a private firm.8 The other direction is allowing private marginal
cost to differ from social marginal cost, which appears in various important situations. The social
marginal cost is larger than the private marginal cost if a negative externality of production exists, such
as pollution. The same is true if a production subsidy is introduced. The social marginal cost is smaller
than the private marginal cost if royalty of licensing exists. The same is true if a vertical relationship
exists, and there is a double marginalization problem.9 Thus, our model formulation incorporates
many important issues from fields such as industrial organization, public economics, and environmental
economics. Especially, the externalities that yield the divergence of social costs from private costs are
important for the analysis of mixed oligopolies, because these externalities may serve as the rationale
for the existence of public financial institutions.
We find that any distribution of roles, simultaneous-move equilibrium, unique equilibrium with
6They used an endogenous competition structure model formulated by Singh and Vives (1984). For more on the topic
of welfare and profit ranking over price and quantity competition in mixed duopolies in a simultaneous-move game, see
Ghosh and Mitra (2010, 2014), and in a sequential-moves game, see Hirose and Matsumura (2019). See Haraguchi and
Matsumura (2016) for an oligopoly version.
7In this study, similar to Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) and Din and Sun (2016), we assume that a public firm is a welfare-
maximizer, whereas a private firm is a profit-maximizer. Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Sedano (2011), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014)
and Naya (2015) discussed different payoff functions and showed that sequential-move outcomes can emerge in equilibrium.
8The literature on mixed oligopolies shows that foreign ownership in private firms often matters. For pioneering works
discussing foreign competition in mixed oligopolies, see Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), and Pal and
White (1998). Foreign ownership is important in the context of public policies in mixed oligopolies. See also Ba´rcena-Ruiz
and Garzo´n (2005a, b), Heywood and Ye (2009b), Lin and Matsumura (2012), and Wang and Lee (2013).
9For discussions on tax-subsidy policy in mixed oligopolies, see Mujumdar and Pal (1998). For discussions on licensing
in mixed oligopolies, see Ye (2012) and Kim et al. (2018). For discussions on vertical relationship in mixed oligopolies,
see Matsumura and Matsushima (2012), Chang and Ryu (2015) and Wu et al. (2016).
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public leadership, unique equilibrium with private leadership, and multiple equilibria with public and
private leadership emerge in equilibrium. This depends on the foreign ownership share in the private
firm, the difference between social and private marginal costs, and the degree of product differentiation.
Our results suggest that both the Koizumi and Abe Cabinets’ policies can be reasonable. Moreover,
we find that public leadership more likely emerges in equilibrium when the foreign ownership share in
private firms is small, in sharp contrast to the result for quantity competition. Our results may explain
the policy shift from the Koizumi to Abe Cabinets, as the presence of foreign financial institutions in
the Japanese banking industry became weaker recently.10
Next, we investigate welfare and profit ranking, comparing public and private leadership. We find
that public leadership is better for social welfare than private leadership when the difference between
social and private marginal costs is small. Private leadership becomes better for social welfare than
public leadership when the cost difference reaches a threshold value. However, as the cost difference
becomes larger and reaches another threshold value, public leadership again becomes better for social
welfare than private leadership. In other words, there is a nonmonotone relationship between the
advantage of public leadership and the difference between social and private marginal costs.
This nonmonotone relationship does not emerge in the ranking of a private firm’s profit. Private
(public) leadership yields greater profit for the private firm than public (private) leadership when the
difference between social and private marginal costs is small (large).
From these results, we find that public leadership and private leadership can be payoff dominant
and risk dominant to private leadership and public leadership, depending on the difference between
social and private marginal costs, the degree of product differentiation, and the foreign ownership share
in the private firm. Our results highlight the importance of these three factors for the equilibrium role
of public firms and the welfare implications.11
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 investigates
10For example, City Bank exited from the Japanese investment banking market in 2009 and from the retail banking
market in 2016. Standard Chartered Bank and HSBC exited from the Japanese private banking market in 2012, and the
Royal Bank of Scotland exited in 2017. In 2006, Ripplewood Holdings, which was a dominant stockholder in Shinsei Bank,
withdraw their investment.
11Matsumura and Ogawa (2009) showed that if one outcome is payoff dominant, this outcome is either the unique
equilibrium or the risk-dominant equilibrium in the observable delay game.
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fixed timing games. Section 4 shows the equilibrium timing of the observable delay game. Section 5
compares welfare and profit of the private firms. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Firms 0 and 1 produce differentiated commodities, and the inverse demand function is given by pi =
a− qi− bqj (i = 0, 1, i ̸= j), where pi and qi are firm i’s price and quantity, respectively, a is a positive
constant, and b ∈ (0, 1) represents the degree of product differentiation. A smaller b implies a larger
product differentiation. The marginal production costs are constant. Let ci and si denote firm i’s
marginal private and social costs, respectively. We assume that a > s0 > c1.
12 Let θ ∈ [0, 1] be the
foreign ownership share in firm 1.
Firm 0 is a domestic state-owned public firm, and its payoff is the total social surplus given by
SW = (p0− s0)q0+(p1− s1)q1+
[
a(q0 + q1)− q
2
0 + 2bq0q1 + q
2
1
2
− p0q0 − p1q1 − θ(p1 − c1)q1
]
(:= V0).
The quasi-linear utility function of a representative consumer, U(q0, q1) = a(q0 + q1) − (q20 + 2bq0q1 +
q21)/2− (p0q0+p1q1), provides the demand and consumer surplus functions adopted in this study. Firm
1 is a private firm and its payoff is its own profit, pi1 = (p1 − c1)q1 (:= V1).
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, each firm i (i = 0, 1) independently chooses whether to
move early (ti = 1) or late (ti = 2). The basic game is then played using simultaneous play (Bertrand)
if both firms choose the same choice, t0 = t1, and sequential play (Stackelberg) otherwise. See Table
1 for the payoff matrix of the observable delay game in our environment, where V Fi (res. V
L
i ) denotes
firm i’s equilibrium payoff in the sequential-move game when it is the follower (res. leader), and V Bi
denotes each firm’s equilibrium payoff in the simultaneous-move game (Bertrand).
3 Three Fixed Timing Games
In this section, we discuss the second stage game given t0 and t1. Let ∆i := si − ci. If there is
a negative (positive) externality of the production of firm i, ∆i is positive (negative). If there is
12If s0 ≤ c0, the public monopoly emerges in equilibrium when the degree of product differentiation is small. To avoid
this problem and to simplify the analysis, we assume s0 > c1.
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Table 1: Payoff matrix of the observable delay game.
0\1 t1 = 1 t1 = 2
t0 = 1
(
V B0 , V
B
1
) (
V L0 , V
F
1
)
t0 = 2
(
V F0 , V
L
1
) (
V B0 , V
B
1
)
production subsidy (production tax), ∆i is positive (negative). If firm i pays royalty of licensing and
the licenser is a domestic investor, ∆i is negative. We assume that the following three games have
interior solutions.
3.1 Bertrand (t0 = t1 = 1 or t0 = t1 = 2)
First, we consider the simultaneous-move game (Bertrand competition). Each firm maximizes its payoff
Vi with respect to pi. The first-order conditions are
∂V0
∂p0
=
−p0 + s0 − b(p1 − s1)− bθ(p1 − c1)
1− b2 = 0,
∂V1
∂p1
=
a(1− b) + c1 + p0 − 2p1
1− b2 = 0.
The second-order conditions are satisfied. From the first-order conditions, we obtain the following
reaction functions for firms 0 and 1, respectively:
R0(p1) = s0 − b∆1 + b(1− θ)(p1 − c1),
R1(p0) =
a(1− b) + c1 + bp0
2
.
Given p1, firm 0’s optimal price does not depend on c0. Because firm 0 cares about welfare, only
social marginal cost s0 matters. For this reason, ∆0 does not appear in firm 0’s reaction function.
However, given p1, firm 0’s optimal price depends on ∆1. The higher ∆1 is, the more likely the profit-
maximizing price by firm 1 yields excessive output level for welfare. Thus, firm 0 has a greater incentive
to reduce firm 1’s output when ∆1 is larger. For this reason, given p1, firm 0’s optimal price is decreasing
in ∆1.
Given p0, firm 1’s optimal price does not depend on s1 because firm 1 cares only about its own
profit.
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These reaction functions lead to the following equilibrium prices:
pB0 =
b(1− θ)(a(1− b)− c1) + 2s0 − 2b∆1
2− b2(1− θ) , (1)
pB1 =
a(1− b) + bs0 + (1− b2(1− θ))c1 − b2∆1
2− b2(1− θ) . (2)
The resulting equilibrium outputs are, respectively,
qB0 =
(2− b2)(a(1− b)− s0 + bs1) + b(1− b2)(a− c1)θ
(1− b2)(2− b2(1− θ)) , (3)
qB1 =
a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1
(1− b2)(2− b2(1− θ)) . (4)
The resulting welfare and firm 1’s profit are, respectively,
V B0 =
X1
2(1− b2)(2− b2(1− θ))2 , (5)
V B1 =
(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 + b2∆1)2
(1− b2)(2− b2(1− θ))2 , (6)
where the X1 and the other coefficient Xi are reported in Appendix A.
3.2 Stackelberg with Public Leadership (t0 = 1, t1 = 2)
Second, we consider the sequential-move game where firm 1 chooses p1 = R1(p0), and firm 0 maximizes
its payoff, V0(p0, R1(p0)). We obtain
pL0 =
b(1− 2θ)(a(1− b)− c1) + 2(2− b2)s0 − 2b∆1
4− 3b2 + 2b2θ , (7)
pF1 =
a(1− b)(2− b2) + 2(1− b2(1− θ))c1 + b(2− b2)s0 − b2∆1
4− 3b2 + 2b2θ . (8)
The resulting equilibrium outputs are, respectively,
qL0 =
a(1− b)(4 + b− 3b2 − b3)− (2− b2)2s0 + b(3− 2b2)c1 + b(2− b2)∆1 + 2b(1− b2)(a− c1)θ
(1− b2)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) ,
qF1 =
(2− b2)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)− b2∆1
(1− b2)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) .
The resulting welfare and firm 1’s profit are, respectively,
V L0 =
X2
2(1− b2)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) , (9)
V F1 =
((2− b2)((1− b)a+ bs0 − c1)− b2∆1)2
(1− b2)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ)2 . (10)
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3.3 Stackelberg with Private Leadership (t0 = 2, t1 = 1)
Third, we consider the sequential-move game where firm 0 chooses p0 = R0(p1), and firm 1 maximizes
its payoff, V1(R0(p1), p1). We obtain
pF0 =
(1− θ)b(a(1− b)− c1 − bs0 + b2∆1) + 2s0 − 2b∆1
2(1− b2(1− θ)) , (11)
pL1 =
a(1− b) + bs0 + (1− 2b2(1− θ))c1 − b2∆1
2(1− b2(1− θ)) . (12)
The resulting equilibrium outputs are, respectively,
qF0 =
2(1− b2)(a(1− b)− s0 + bs1) + bθ(a(1− b)(1 + 2b)− bs0 − (1− 2b2)c1 + b2∆1)
2(1− b2)(1− b2(1− θ)) ,
qL1 =
a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1
2(1− b2) .
The resulting welfare and firm 1’s profit are, respectively,
V F0 =
X3
8(1− b2)(1− b2(1− b2(1− θ))2 , (13)
V L1 =
(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1)2
4(1− b2)(1− b2(1− θ)) . (14)
4 Equilibrium Role
In this section, we discuss the first stage choices and show the equilibrium outcome in the observable
delay game. Before presenting our main results (Propositions 1 and 3), we present three supplementary
results on the comparison of the equilibrium prices among three fixed timing games (Lemmas 1–3).
These lemmas are helpful for understanding the intuition behind our main results.
First, we present a result highlighting the strategic behavior of the leaders.
Lemma 1 (i) There exists ∆˜ > 0 such that pB0 > p
L
0 if and only if ∆1 < ∆˜. (ii) ∆˜ is increasing in θ.
(iii) pB1 ≤ pL1 and thus pB0 ≤ pF0 regardless of ∆1, and the equality holds if and only if θ = 1.
Proof See Appendix B.
First, we explain the intuition behind Lemma 1(i,ii). Suppose that ∆1 is small. Due to the price-
making behavior of firm 1, firm 1’s resulting output level is too low (firm 1’s price is too high) for
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welfare, and thus, firm 0 has an incentive to lower firm 1’s price. As the leader, firm 0 chooses a lower
price than pB0 because firm 1’s reaction curve is upward sloping (strategic complement). Therefore,
pL0 < p
B
0 when ∆1 is small.
Suppose that ∆1 is large. Because firm 1 chooses its price without considering its high social cost,
firm 1’s resulting output level is too high (firm 1’s price is too low) for welfare, and thus, firm 0 has an
incentive to raise firm 1’s price. As a leader, firm 0 chooses a higher price than pB0 . Therefore, p
L
0 > p
B
0
when ∆1 is large.
Because firm 1’s output is more likely to be excessive for domestic welfare when firm 1 is more
foreign (i.e., θ is larger), pL0 < p
B
0 more likely holds when θ is larger (Lemma 1(ii)).
Second, we explain the intuition behind Lemma 1(iii). Firm 1’s profit increases with firm 0’s price,
and firm 0’s reaction curve is upward sloping (strategic complement) unless θ = 1 (and firm 0’s optimal
price is independent of p1 if θ = 1). Thus, firm 1 chooses a higher price than p
B
1 to raise firm 0’s
price unless θ = 1. Therefore, pL1 > p
B
1 , regardless of ∆1. Because the strategy of firm 0 is strategic
complement, pF0 > p
B
0 holds, unless θ = 1.
Next, we present another supplementary result highlighting how ∆1 affects firm 0’s equilibrium
prices among the three games.
Lemma 2 0 > ∂pL0 /∂∆1 > ∂p
B
0 /∂∆1 and 0 > ∂p
L
0 /∂∆1 > ∂p
F
0 /∂∆1.
Proof See Appendix B.
We explain the intuition behind Lemma 2. Lemma 2 states that pB0 , p
L
0 , and p
F
0 are decreasing in
∆1. As ∆1 increases, the output level of firm 1 is more likely to be excessive for welfare. Thus, firm 0
has a greater incentive to reduce q1 as ∆1 increases. Given p1, a decrease in p0 reduces q1. Therefore,
firm 0 chooses smaller p0 as ∆1 increases in all of three fixed timing games.
Firm 0 has a greater incentive to raise p1 to reduce q1 as ∆1 increases. Thus, as the leader, firm
0 has a greater incentive to raise pL0 when ∆1 is larger. This partially cancels out the above price-
reducing effect of ∆1. Such an effect does not exist when firm 0 is the follower or when two firms move
simultaneously. Therefore, an increase in ∆1 reduces p
L
0 less significantly than p
B
0 and p
F
0 .
Finally, we present a result on the comparison of firm 0’s price in public leadership as opposed to
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private leadership.
Lemma 3 There exists ∆¯ (≥ ∆˜) such that pL0 < pF0 if and only if ∆1 < ∆¯ and ∆¯ = ∆˜ if and only if
θ = 1.
Proof See Appendix B.
Regardless of ∆1, p
F
0 > p
B
0 (Lemma 1(iii)). When ∆1 < ∆˜, p
L
0 < p
B
0 . Thus, when ∆1 is small,
pL0 < p
F
0 . Lemma 2 states that p
F
0 decreases more significantly than p
L
0 as ∆1 increases. Thus, p
L
0 > p
F
0
holds when ∆1 is large. These yield Lemma 3.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between equilibrium prices of firm 0 and ∆1.
Figure 1: Equilibrium price of public firm.
We now present one of our main results. Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium roles in the
observable delay game.
Proposition 1 Suppose that θ < 1. (i) There exists ∆a > 0 such that in equilibrium t0 = t1 = 1
(t0 ̸= t1) if ∆1 < ∆a (∆1 > ∆a). (ii) There exists ∆b(≥ ∆a) such that a unique Stackelberg equilibrium
exists (two Stackelberg equilibria exist) if ∆1 ∈ (∆a,∆b) (if ∆1 ≥ ∆b). (iii) Suppose that ∆1 ∈ (∆a,∆b).
There exists θa < 1/2 such that in equilibrium (t0, t1) = (1, 2) ((t0, t1) = (2, 1)) if θ < θa (θ > θa), and
∆a = ∆b if θ = θa.
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Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 1(i) states that whether Bertrand or Stackelberg emerges in equilibrium depends on
the difference between the social and private marginal costs of firm 1. If there is no difference or the
private marginal cost exceeds the social marginal cost (i.e., the cost difference ∆1 is negative), Bertrand
emerges regardless of the foreign ownership share in firm 1 or the degree of product differentiation.
However, if the cost difference ∆1 exceeds the threshold value, Stackelberg emerges. This implies
that if there are negative externalities of production or if the private firm’s production is subsidized,
Stackelberg can emerge in equilibrium. Proposition 1(iii) states that two Stackelberg equilibria (public
leadership and private leadership equilibria) emerges if the cost difference ∆1 exceeds another threshold
value. Proposition 1(iii) states that public leadership is more likely to become a unique equilibrium
than private leadership when the foreign ownership share in firm 1 is lower. This result may explain
the recent revival of public leadership by Japanese public financial institutions, as discussed in the
Introduction.
We now explain the intuition behind Proposition 1. Suppose that ∆1 is small. Lemma 1(i) states
that pL0 < p
B
0 . Given t0 = 1, firm 1 has an incentive to prevent firm 0’s leadership by choosing t1 = 1.
Therefore, the public leadership equilibrium does not emerge. Lemma 1(iii) states that pL1 > p
B
1 . As
we explain in the intuitive explanation for Lemma 1(i), firm 0 prefers a lower firm 1’s price when
∆1 is small. Thus, given t1 = 1, firm 0 has an incentive to prevent firm 1’s leadership by choosing
t0 = 1. Therefore, private leadership equilibrium does not emerge. Because neither public leadership
nor private leadership emerges in equilibrium, the only equilibrium outcome is Bertrand.
Suppose that ∆1 is large. Lemma 1(i) states that p
L
0 > p
B
0 . Given t0 = 1, firm 1 chooses t1 = 2
to raise p0. Therefore, the public leadership equilibrium emerges. As we explain in the intuitive
explanation for Lemma 1(i), firm 0 prefers a higher p1 when ∆1 is large. Thus, given t1 = 1, firm 0
chooses t0 = 2 to raise p1. Therefore, the private leadership equilibrium emerges.
Suppose that ∆1 is intermediate and θ is small. Given t1 = 1, choosing t0 = 2 raises p1. Although
a marginal increase in p1 from p
B
1 improves welfare, p
L
1 can be too high for welfare, and it is possible
that pB1 is better than p
L
1 for welfare. In this case, private leadership fails to result in equilibrium, and
12
the unique equilibrium is public leadership.
Suppose that ∆1 is intermediate and that θ is large. Firm 1’s output level is more likely to be too
high (the price level is too low) for welfare when θ is larger because the higher market share of firm 1
increases the outflow of the surplus to foreign investors. Thus, it is less likely that pB1 (< p
L
1 ) is better
than pL1 for welfare. Therefore, the private leadership equilibrium is more likely to survive. This effect
can be so strong that the private leadership equilibrium exists even when the condition for the existence
of the public leadership equilibrium is not satisfied. For this reason, the unique equilibrium can involve
private leadership when θ is large.
We now present a result when θ = 1, which is not covered by our main result (Proposition 1).
Proposition 2 Suppose that θ = 1. (i) V B0 = V
F
0 and V
L
1 = V
B
1 . Moreover, V
L
0 = V
B
0 = V
F
0 and
V L1 = V
B
1 = V
F
1 when ∆1 = ∆˜. (ii) Bertrand is an equilibrium outcome if ∆1 ≤ ∆˜. (iii) Public
leadership is an equilibrium outcome if ∆1 ≥ ∆˜. (iv) Private leadership is an equilibrium outcome
regardless of ∆.
Proof See Appendix B.
From (1), we obtain that the public firm’s optimal price does not depend on p1 when θ = 1.
Therefore, as the leader, the private firm cannot affect p0 and chooses the same price as in the Bertrand
case. This leads to Proposition 2(i).
Proposition 2(ii) states that Bertrand equilibrium emerges when ∆1 is small, while the public
leadership equilibrium emerges when ∆1 is large. These results are like those for Proposition 1(ii).
However, Proposition 2(iv) states that the private leadership equilibrium emerges regardless of ∆1,
which is in sharp contrast to Proposition 1(ii). Thus, some readers might perceive that there is a
discontinuity with respect to θ at the point θ = 1.
We think that the discrepancy between Propositions 1 and 2 is smaller than what it appears at
first glance. In the private leadership equilibrium, both firms adopt weakly dominated strategies when
∆1 < ∆˜. When ∆1 < ∆˜, both Bertrand and the private leadership equilibria exist. However, Bertrand
equilibrium is risk dominant. Thus, from the viewpoint of the standard discussion of equilibrium
selection (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988), it is natural to focus on Bertrand equilibrium, not the private
13
leadership equilibrium, when ∆1 is small, a result similar to that for Proposition 1.
This result shows a possible risk of using the model with pure foreign private firms in mixed
oligopolies. The result that the private leadership equilibrium always exists holds only when domestic
investors own a 0% share in the private firm.
5 Welfare and Profit Ranking
We now present another main result (Proposition 3), which concerns welfare and profit ranking in
public and private leadership. Let
∆c :=
(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)[(1− b2)(6− 5b2 − 2θ(2− 5b2))− b2θ2(4− 7b2 + 2b2θ))−X4]
(4− 3b4)(1− b2) + 8b4(1− b2)θ(1− θ) + b4θ2(4− b2 − 2b2θ) ,
∆d :=
(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)[5b4 − 12b2 + 8 + 8b2θ(1− b2) + 4b4θ2 −X5]
b2(4b4θ2 + 12b2θ(1− b2) + 9b4 − 20b2 + 12) .
∆e :=
(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)[(1− b2)(6− 5b2 − 2θ(2− 5b2))− b2θ2(4− 7b2 + 2b2θ)) +X4]
(4− 3b4)(1− b2) + 8b4(1− b2)θ(1− θ) + b4θ2(4− b2 − 2b2θ) .
Proposition 3 Suppose that θ < 1. (i) ∆c,∆d,∆e > 0. (ii) ∆c < ∆e. (iii) V
L
0 < V
F
0 if and only if
∆1 ∈ (∆c,∆e). (iv) V L1 > V F1 if and only if ∆1 < ∆d.
Proof See Appendix B.
Suppose that θ < 1. Public leadership is better for social welfare than private leadership (V L0 > V
F
0 )
when the difference between social and private marginal costs ∆1 is small (when ∆1 < ∆c). Private
leadership becomes better for social welfare than public leadership when the cost difference reaches a
threshold value (∆c). However, as the cost difference becomes larger and reaches yet another threshold
vale (∆e), public leadership again becomes better for social welfare than private leadership. In other
words, there is a nonmonotone relationship between the advantage of public leadership and the cost
difference between social and private marginal costs (Proposition 3(iii)).
Similar nonmonotone relationship does not emerge in the ranking of the private firm’s profit (Propo-
sition 3(iv)). The private leadership yields greater profit of firm 1 than public leadership (V L1 > V
F
1 )
when the cost difference between social and private marginal costs is small (when ∆1 < ∆d). The pub-
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Figure 2-1
Figure 2-3
Figure 2-2
Figure 2-4
Figure 2: Numerical examples of ∆c and ∆d where a = 100, s0 = 10, and c1 = 5. b = 0.1, 0.4, 0.6, and
0.9 in Figures 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4, respectively.
lic leadership becomes better for the private firm than the private leadership when the cost difference
exceeds a threshold value (∆d).
Moreover, Proposition 3 implies that public leadership is payoff dominant to private leadership
when ∆1 > max{∆d,∆e}. In addition, if ∆c < ∆d, private leadership can be payoff dominant to public
leadership (private leadership is payoff dominant to public leadership when ∆1 ∈ (∆c,min{∆d,∆e})).
Although we fail to prove that ∆c ≤ ∆d always hold, we numerically show that the inequality ∆c < ∆d
holds for a wide range of parameter values (Figure 2).13
As Matsumura and Ogawa (2009) showed, payoff dominance implies risk dominance in the observ-
able delay game. These results show that both private and public leadership can be risk dominant
and payoff dominant. This implies that both can be robust, depending on the cost difference between
13We did not find a numerical example in which the inequality ∆c > ∆d holds.
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social and private marginal costs. These results are in sharp contrast to those of Capuano and De
Feo (2010) and Matsumura and Ogawa (2010), and they may explain the recent fluctuations in the
Japanese government’s policy regarding public financial institutions, as discussed in Introduction.
We now explain the intuition behind the results on welfare ranking in Proposition 3. As the leader,
firm 0 can choose p0 = p
B
0 . This implies that V
L
0 ≥ V B0 , regardless of ∆1 and θ. As the leader, firm
1 chooses p1 = p
L
1 > p
B
1 . We have already explained that p
L
1 is too high for welfare when ∆1 is small.
Thus, V F0 < V
B
0 . Therefore, V
L
0 > V
F
0 when ∆1 is small.
As ∆1 reaches a threshold value, p
L
1 becomes optimal for welfare. Thereafter, p
L
1 becomes too low
for welfare as ∆1 increases. As the leader, firm 1 chooses p1 = p
L
1 > p
B
1 , and welfare advantage of
private leadership increases, and eventually V L0 < V
F
0 holds. Note that p
L
0 ̸= R(pF1 ) and pF0 = R(pL1 ).
In other words, the public firm chooses the optimal price with p1 as the follower, but it does not choose
the optimal price with p1 as the leader. Therefore, the advantage of private leadership appears as long
as pL1 is close to the optimal price for welfare.
When ∆1 increases further, the difference between welfare optimal p1 and p
L
1 becomes larger, which
worsens the welfare performance of private leadership. Therefore, the advantage of public leadership
again emerges when ∆1 is very large.
We then explain the intuition behind the results on profit ranking in Proposition 3. As the leader,
firm 1 can choose p1 = p
B
1 . This implies that V
L
1 ≥ V B1 regardless of ∆1 and θ. Moreover, because
pL1 ̸= pB1 , V L1 > V B1 holds. As we showed, pL0 < pB0 and thus V F1 < V B1 , when ∆1 is small. Therefore,
V L1 > V
F
1 when ∆1 is small.
As ∆1 reaches a threshold vale, p
L
0 = p
B
0 (and thus V
F
1 = V
B
1 ) holds, and thereafter, p
L
0 > p
B
0
(and thus V F1 > V
B
1 ) holds as ∆1 increases. The profit advantage of public leadership increases as ∆1
increases, and eventually V L1 < V
F
1 holds. Note that p
L
1 ̸= R(pF0 ) and pF1 = R(pL0 ). In other words, the
private firm chooses the optimal price given p0 as the follower, but it does not choose the optimal price
given p0 as the leader. Therefore, the advantage of public leadership emerges.
We now present a result when θ = 1, which is not covered by our main result (Proposition 3).
Proposition 4 Suppose that θ = 1 (i)∆c = ∆d = ∆e = ∆˜. (ii) V
L
0 ≥ V F0 and the equality holds if and
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only if ∆1 = ∆d. (iii) V
L
1 > V
F
1 if and only if ∆1 < ∆d.
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 4(iii) states that private leadership yields greater profits for the private firm than public
leadership when ∆1 is small, which is the same result as in Proposition 3(iv). We omit the intuitive
explanation, because the intuition behind Proposition 4(iii) is similar to that for Proposition 3(iv).
Proposition 4(ii) states that public leadership always yields greater welfare than private leadership,
in contrast to Proposition 3. Proposition 4 is a degenerated version of Proposition 3. Because all
∆c,∆d, and ∆e converge to the same value when θ → 1, the range of ∆1 for the welfare advantage of
private leadership over public leadership, (∆c,∆e), disappears as θ → 1 (Figure 3). This result again
shows a possible risk of using the model with pure foreign private firms in mixed oligopolies. The result
that public leadership always yields greater welfare holds only when domestic investors own a 0% share
in the private firm.
Figure 3: Numerical examples of ∆e −∆c where a = 100, s0 = 10, and c1 = 5.
The intuition behind Proposition 4(ii) is as follows. As we stated in the previous section, firm
0’s optimal price does not depend on p1. Therefore, Bertrand equilibrium and the private leadership
equilibrium yields the same prices, and thus, the same profits and welfare. Because as the leader, firm
0 can choose pB0 (and then firm 1 chooses p
B
1 ), the welfare in the public leadership equilibrium is never
smaller than that in the private leadership equilibrium.
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Proposition 4(i) states that profit and welfare ranking depends on the sign of pL0 − pB0 . Remember
that pL0 < (>,=)p
B
0 if ∆1 < (>,=)∆˜. Because V
L
0 = V
B
0 holds only when p
L
0 = p
B
0 , and V
B
0 = V
F
0
always holds when θ = 1, welfare ranking depends only on whether pL0 = p
B
0 or not. This leads to
∆c = ∆e = ∆˜. Because V
F
1 > (<,=)V
B
1 holds only when p
L
0 > (<,=)p
B
0 and V
L
1 = V
B
1 holds, profit
ranking depends only on the sign of pL0 − pB0 . This leads to ∆d = ∆˜. Remember that ∆d is a threshold
value determining the sign of V L1 −V F1 and that ∆˜ is a threshold value determining the sign of pL0 −pF0 .
6 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we examine an endogenous timing game in mixed duopolies with price competition when
social marginal costs are allowed to differ from private marginal costs. We find that any equilibrium
timing can emerge, depending on the foreign ownership share in the private firm and the difference
between social and private marginal costs. We show that the public firm is more likely to lead when
the private competitor is domestic, which may explain the recent change in policies in Japan regarding
public financial institutions.
In this study, we consider a single market model. As Haraguchi et al. (2018) pointed out, public
firms face competitive pressure from neighboring markets, and extending our analysis to a multi-market
model is an opportunity for future research.14
In this study, we also consider a duopoly model. Extending our analysis to n-firm oligopolies would
be quite a tough assignment, and it is beyond the scope of the current study. This is another opportunity
for future work.
14For discussions on optimal privatization policy in multi-market models, see also Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2017) and
Dong et al. (2018).
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Appendix A
X1 := −(1− b2)(a− c1)b2(a(1− 2b) + 2bs0 − c1)θ2 − [2b2(1− b2)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)∆1
− 2b3(1− b2)∆20 + 4b(1− b2)(a(1 + b− b2)− bc0 − (1− b2)c1)∆0 + 2(1− b2)2c21
− 4(1− b2)2(a(1− b) + bc0)c1 − 2b2(1− b2)c20 + 4a(1− b2)(1 + b− b2)c0
+ 2a2(1− b2)(1− 2b− 2b2 + 2b3)]θ + b4∆21 − 2(2− 2b2 + b4)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)∆1
+ (2b4 − 5b2 + 4)∆20 − 2((b5 − 3b3 + 3b)c1 − (2b4 − 5b2 + 4)c0 − (b5 − 2b4 − 3b3 + 5b2 + 3b− 4)a)∆0
+ (b4 − 3b2 + 3)c21 − 2(3− 3b2 + b4)(a(1− b) + bc0)c1 + (2b4 − 5b2 + 4)c20
− 2a(1− b)(b4 − b3 − 4b2 + b+ 4)c0 + a2(1− b)(2b4 − b3 − 7b2 + b+ 7),
X2 := −[4b(1− b2)(a− c1)∆0 + 2(1− b2)c21 − 4(1− b2)(a(1− b) + bc0)c1 + 4ab(1− b2)c0
+ 2a2(1− b2)(1− 2b)]θ + b2∆21 − 2(2− b2)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)∆1 + (2− b2)2∆20
+ 2((2b3 − 3b)c1 + (2− b2)2c0 − (b4 + 2b3 − 4b2 − 3b+ 4)a)∆0 − (2b2 − 3)c21
− 2(3− 2b2)(a(1− b) + bc0)c1 + (2− b2)2c20 − 2a(1− b)(4 + b− 3b3 − b3)c0
+ a2(1− b)(7 + b− 5b2 − b3),
X3 := [b
6∆21 − 2b4(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)∆1 + b4∆20 − 2b3((4b2 − 3)c1 − bc0 + (3 + b− 4b2)a)∆0
+ b2(4b2 − 3)c21 + 2b2(3− 4b2)(a(1− b) + bc0)c1 + b4c20 − 2ab3(1− b)(3 + 4b)c0
+ a2b2(1− b)(8b2 + 3b− 3)]θ2 + [2b4(1− b2)∆21 − 8b2(1− b2)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)∆1
+ 6b2(1− b2)∆20 − 4b(1− b2)((4b2 − 1)c1 − 3bc0 + (1 + 3b− 4b2)a)∆0 − 2(1− b2)(1− 4b2)c21
+ 4(1− b2)(1− 4b2)(a(1− b) + bc0)c1 + 6b2(1− b2)c20 − 4ab(1− b)2(1 + b)(1 + 4b)c0
− 2a2(1− b2)(1 + b)(1− b− 8b2)]θ + b4(b2 − 1)∆21 − 2(1− b2)(2− 3b2)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)∆1
+ (1− b2)(4− 5b2)∆20 + 2(1− b2)((4b3 − 3b)c1 − (5b2 − 4)c0 − (4b3 − 5b2 − 3b+ 4)a)∆0
− (1− b2)(3− 4b2)c21 − 2(1− b2)(3− 4b2)(a(1− b) + bc0)c1 + (1− b2)(4− 5b2)c20
− 2a(1− b)2(1 + b)(4 + b− 4b2)c0 + a2(1− b)3(1 + b)(7 + 8b),
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X4 := 2(1− b2)(1− θ)(1− b2(1− θ))
√
4− 3b2 + 2b2θ,
X5 := 2(1− b2)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ)
√
1− b2(1− θ),
X6 := (1− b2)(4− 3b2)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1) + b2(1− b2)θ(5(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)− 3(4− b2)∆1)
+ b2θ2((2 + b2)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)− 3b2(2− b2)∆1) + b4θ3(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1),
X7 := [b
4 − 7b2 + 8 + 4b2θ − b4θ]((1− b)a+ bs0 − c1)− (6b2 − 4b4 + 3b4θ)∆1,
X8 := (−2b6θ3 + b4(7b2 − 4)θ2 + 8b4(1− b2)θ + 3b6 − 3b4 − 4b2 + 4)∆21 + 2(2b4θ3 − b2(7b2 − 4)θ2
+ 2(1− b2)(2− 5b2)θ − 5b4 + 11b2 − 6)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)∆1 − (2b2θ3 + b2(1− 4b2)θ2
+ 4(1− b2)(1− 2b2)θ − (1− b2)(5− 4b2))(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)2,
X9 := b
2(4b4θ2 + 12b2(1− b2)θ + 9b4 − 20b2 + 12)∆21 − 2(4b4θ2 + 8b2(1− b2)θ + 5b4 − 12b2 + 8)(a(1− b)
+ bs0 − c1)∆1 + (4b2θ2 + 4b2θ(1− b2) + 4b2 − 11b2 + 8)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)2,
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Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1
From (1) and (7), we obtain
pB0 − pL0 =
2b((1− b2(1− θ))(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)− (2(1− b2) + b2θ)∆1)
(2− b2(1− θ))(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) > 0
⇔ ∆1 < ∆˜ := (1− b
2(1− θ))(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)
2(1− b2) + b2θ .
Because we suppose that a > s0 > c1, we obtain a(1 − b) + bs0 − c1 = (a − c1) − b(a − s0) > 0. This
implies ∆˜ > 0. These results imply Lemma 1(i).
Differentiating ∆˜ with respect to θ yields
∂∆˜
∂θ
=
b2(1− b2)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)
(2(1− b2) + b2θ)2 > 0.
This implies Lemma 1(ii).
Because we assume an interior solution in the price competition stage, from (4), we obtain a(1 −
b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1 > 0. From (2) and (12), we obtain
pB1 − pL1 = −
(1− θ)b2(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1)
2(1− b2(1− θ))(2− b2(1− θ)) ≤ 0, (15)
and the equality in (15) holds if and only if θ = 1. From (1) and (11), we obtain
pB0 − pF0 = −
(1− θ)2b3(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1)
2(1− b2(1− θ))(2− b2(1− θ)) ≤ 0, (16)
and the equality in (16) holds if and only if θ = 1. These imply Lemma 1(iii). ■
Proof of Lemma 2
From (1), (7) and (11), we obtain
∂pB0
∂∆1
= − 2b
2− b2(1− θ) < 0, (17)
∂pL0
∂∆1
= − 2b
4− 3b2 + 2b2θ < 0, (18)
∂pF0
∂∆1
= − b(2− b
2(1− θ))
2(1− b2(1− θ)) < 0. (19)
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From (17)-(19), we obtain
∂pB0
∂∆1
− ∂p
L
0
∂∆1
= − 4b(1− b
2(1− θ))
(2− b2)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) < 0,
∂pF0
∂∆1
− ∂p
L
0
∂∆1
= −b(3(1− b
2)2 + 2b2(2(1− b2θ) + b2θ2) + 1− b4θ)
2(1− b2(1− θ))(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) < 0.
These results imply Lemma 2.■
Proof of Lemma 3
From (7) and (11), we obtain
pL0 − pF0 =
−(2− b2 − b2θ + 2b2θ)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1) + (4− 6b2 + 3b4 + b2(4− 5b2)θ + 2b4θ2)s1
2(1− b2(1− θ))(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) < 0
⇔ ∆1 < ∆¯ := (2− b
2 − b2θ + 2b2θ)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)
4− 6b2 + 3b4 + b2(4− 5b2)θ + 2b4θ2 .
Comparing ∆˜ and ∆¯, we obtain
∆¯− ∆˜ = b
2(1− b2)(1− θ)2(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ)
(2− 2b2 + b2θ)(4− 6b2 + 3b4 + 4b2 − 5b4θ + 2b4θ2) ≥ 0.
The equality holds if and only if θ = 1. These results imply Lemma 3.■
Proof of Proposition 1
From (5), (6), (9), (10), (13), and (14), we obtain
V L0 − V B0 =
b2[(1− b2(1− θ))(a(1− b) + bs0 − (c1 +∆1)) + (1− b2)∆1]2
2(1− b2)(2− b2(1− θ))2(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) ≥ 0, (20)
V B0 − V F0 =
b2(1− θ)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1)X6
8(1− b2)(1− b2(1− θ))2(2− b2(1− θ))2 , (21)
V L1 − V B1 =
b4(1− θ)2(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1)2
4(1− b2)(1− b2(1− θ))(2− b2(1− θ))2 ≥ 0, (22)
V B1 − V F1 =
b2[(1− b2(1− θ))(a(1− b) + bs0 − (c1 +∆1)) + (1− b2)∆1]X7
(1− b2)(2− b2(1− θ))2(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ)2 . (23)
The equality in (20) holds if and only if ∆1 = ∆˜. The equality in (22) holds if and only if θ = 1.
Proof of Proposition 1(i)
Bertrand (t0 = t1 = 1) is an equilibrium if and only if both (21) and (23) are nonnegative, and Bertrand
is the unique equilibrium if both are positive.
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Equation (21) is positive (negative, zero) if X6 > (<,=)0. Solving the equation X6 = 0 with respect
to ∆1, we obtain
∆1 = ∆ˆ :=
((1− b2)(4− 3b2) + 5b2(1− b2)θ + b2(2 + b2)θ2 + b4θ3)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)
(1− b2)(b4 − 8b2 + 8) + 3b2(1− b2)(4− b2)θ + 3b4θ2 + b6θ3 .
We now show that X7 is positive. Because we assume an interior solution in the price competition
stage, from (4), we obtain
a(1− b) + bs0 − c1 − b2∆1 > 0⇔ ∆1 < a(1− b) + bs0 − c1
b2
.
X7 > 0 if
∆1 <
(b4 − 7b2 + 8 + 4b2θ − b4θ)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1))
6b2 − 4b4 + 3b4θ .
We obtain
a(1− b) + bs0 − c1
b2
− (b
4 − 7b2 + 8 + 4b2θ − b4θ)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1))
6b2 − 4b4 + 3b4θ
= −(1− b
2)(2− b2(1− θ))(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)
b2(6− 4b2 + 3b2θ) < 0.
These imply X7 > 0.
Because X7 is positive, equation (23) is positive (negative, zero) if (1−b2(1−θ))(a(1−b)+bs0−(c1+
∆1))+(1−b2)∆1 > (<,=)0. Solving the equation (1−b2(1−θ))(a(1−b)+bs0−(c1+∆1))+(1−b2)∆1 = 0
with respect to ∆1, we obtain
∆1 =
(1− b2(1− θ))((1− b)a+ bs0 − c1)
2(1− b2) + b2θ = ∆˜.
Therefore, both (21) and (23) are positive if ∆1 < ∆a := min{∆ˆ, ∆˜}. Because (1− b)a+ bs0 − c1 > 0,
we obtain ∆ˆ > 0 and ∆˜ > 0. Thus, ∆a > 0. ■
Proof of Proposition 1(ii)
Two Stackelberg equilibria exist (both (t0, t1) = (1, 2) and (t0, t1) = (2, 1) are the equilibrium outcomes)
if and only if both (21) and (23) are nonpositive. Only one Stackelberg equilibrium exists (either
(t0, t1) = (1, 2) or (t0, t1) = (2, 1) is the equilibrium outcome) if and only if one of (21) and (23) is
nonpositive and the other is positive. Let ∆b := max{∆ˆ, ∆˜}. One of (21) and (23) is positive and the
23
other is negative if ∆1 ∈ (∆a,∆b). Both are negative if ∆1 > ∆b. These imply Proposition 1(ii). ■
Proof of Proposition 1(iii)
As we have shown in the proof of Proposition 1(i), private leadership is an equilibrium if ∆1 ≥ ∆ˆ, and
public leadership is an equilibrium if ∆1 ≥ ∆˜. Therefore, if ∆ˆ > ∆˜ (∆ˆ < ∆˜), the unique Stackelberg is
public leadership (private leadership) when ∆1 ∈ (∆a,∆b).
From ∆ˆ and ∆˜, we obtain
∆ˆ− ∆˜ = b
2(1− b2)(1− θ)(2− b2(1− θ))[(1− b2)(1− 2θ)− b2θ2]
(2− b2(2− θ))[(1− b2)(8− 8b2 + b4) + 3b2(1− b2)(4− b2)θ + 3b4(2− b2)θ2 + b6θ3] . (24)
Equation (24) is positive (negative, zero) if (1 − b2)(1 − 2θ) − b2θ2 > (<,=)0. Solving the equation
(1− b2)(1− 2θ)− b2θ2 = 0, we obtain
(1− b2)(1− 2θ)− b2θ2 = 0→ θ = −(1− b
2)±√1− b2
b2
.
The positive solution is
θa :=
−(1− b2) +√1− b2
b2
. (25)
Therefore, we obtain ∆ˆ > (<,=)∆˜ if θ < (>,=)θa.
From (25), we obtain
dθa
db
= −2(1−
√
1− b2)
b3
√
1− b2 < 0,
θa =
−(1− b2) +√1− b2
b2
→ 0 (b→ 1),
θa =
−(1− b2) +√1− b2
b2
=
1− b2√
1− b2 + 1− b2 →
1
2
(b→ 0).
Thus, θa ∈ (0, 1/2). These imply Proposition 1(iii). ■
Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting θ = 1 into (21) and (22) we obtain Proposition 2(i).
Bertrand equilibrium emerges if both (21) and (23) are nonnegative. (21) is always zero when θ = 1.
(23) is nonnegative if and only if ∆1 ≤ ∆˜. These imply Proposition 2(ii).
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Public leadership is an equilibrium outcome if (20) is nonnegative and (23) is nonpositive. (20) is
always nonnegative. (23) is nonpositive if and only if ∆1 ≥ ∆˜. These imply Proposition 2(iii).
Private leadership is an equilibrium if (21) is nonpositive and (22) is nonnegative. Both (21) and
(22) are zero when θ = 1. These imply Proposition 2(iv). ■
Proof of Proposition 3(i,ii)
First, we show ∆c > 0. ∆c > 0 if the numerator of ∆c is positive. Let A := (1− b2)(6− 5b2 − 2θ(2−
5b2))− b2θ2(4− 7b2 + 2b2θ)−X4. We obtain
A = (1− b2)(6− 5b2 − 2θ(2− 5b2))− b2θ2(4− 7b2 + 2b2θ)−X4
= (1− b2)(6− 5b2 − 2θ(2− 5b2))− b2θ2(4− 7b2 + 2b2θ)
−2(1− b2)(1− θ)(1− b2(1− θ))
√
4− 3b2 + 2b2θ
≥ (1− b2)(6− 5b2 − 2θ(2− 5b2))− b2θ2(4− 7b2 + 2b2θ)− 4(1− b2)(1− θ)(1− b2(1− θ))
= (1− b2)(2− b2) + 2b2(1− b2)θ + b4(3− 2θ)θ2 > 0.
Inequality in the fourth line follows from
√
4− 3b2 + 2b2θ ∈ (1, 2). This implies ∆c > 0.
Next, we show ∆c < ∆e. Comparing ∆c and ∆e, we obtain
∆e −∆c = 4(1− b
2)(1− b2(1− θ))(1− θ)(a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)
√
4− 3b2 + 2b2θ
(4− 3b4)(1− b2) + 8b4(1− b2)θ(1− θ) + b4θ2(4− b2 − 2b2θ) > 0. (26)
This implies ∆c < ∆e.
We then show ∆d > 0. ∆d > 0 if the numerator of ∆d is positive. Let B := 5b
4−12b2+8+8b2θ(1−
b2) + 4b4θ2 −X5. We obtain
B = 5b4 − 12b2 + 8 + 8b2θ(1− b2) + 4b4θ2 −X5
= 5b4 − 12b2 + 8 + 8b2θ(1− b2) + 4b4θ2 − 2(1− b2)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ)
√
1− b2(1− θ)
≥ 5b4 − 12b2 + 8 + 8b2θ(1− b2) + 4b4θ2 − 2(1− b2)(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ)
= b2(2− b2) + 4b2θ(1− b2(1− θ)) > 0.
Inequality in the third line follows from
√
1− b2(1− θ) ∈ (0, 1). This implies ∆d > 0. ■
Proof of Proposition 3(iii)
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First, we examine the welfare ranking. From (9) and (13), we obtain
V L0 − V F0 =
b2X8
8(1− b2)(1− b2(1− θ))2(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ) . (27)
Equation (27) is positive (negative, zero) if X8 > (<,=)0. Solving the equation X8 = 0 with respect
to ∆1, we obtain
X8 = 0→ ∆1 = (a(1− b) + bs0 − c1)[((1− b
2)(6− 5b2 − 2θ(2− 5b2)− b2θ2(4− 7b2 + 2b2θ))±X4]
(1− b2)(4− 3b2 + b4θ(4(2− θ) + 7b2θ + 2b2θ2)) .
Note that ∆c and ∆e are solutions of this equation.
Then, we obtain
X8 < 0 (and thus V
L
0 < V
F
0 ), if ∆1 ∈ (∆c,∆e),
X8 = 0 (and thus V
L
0 = V
F
0 ), if ∆1 = ∆c or ∆e,
X8 > 0 (and thus V
L
0 > V
F
0 ), otherwise.
This implies Proposition 3(iii). ■
Proof of Proposition 3(iv)
We examine the profit ranking. If ∆1 < ∆˜, then p
B
0 > p
L
0 . Because p
B
1 = R1(p
B
0 ), p
F
1 = R1(p
L
0 ), and
pi1(p0, R1(p0)) is increasing in p0, we obtain V
F
1 < V
B
1 . Because V
L
1 ≥ V B1 , we obtain V F1 < V L1 .
If ∆1 > ∆¯, then p
F
0 < p
L
0 . Because p
F
1 = R1(p
L
0 ), pi1(p0, R1(p0)) is increasing in p0, and pi1(p0, R1(p0)) ≥
pi1(p0, p1) for any p1, we obtain V
F
1 > V
L
1 .
We now investigate profit ranking when ∆1 ∈ [∆˜, ∆¯]. From (10) and (14), we obtain
V L1 − V F1 =
b2X9
4(1− b2)(1− b2(1− θ))2(4− 3b2 + 2b2θ)2 . (28)
Equation (28) is positive (negative, zero) if X9 > (<,=)0. We obtain X9 = 0 if ∆1 = ∆d ∈ (∆˜, ∆¯). If
∆1 < ∆d, then X9 > 0 holds, and thus, we obtain V
L
1 > V
F
1 . If ∆1 ∈ [∆d, ∆¯], then X9 < 0 holds, and
thus, we obtain V L1 < V
F
1 . ■
Proof of Proposition 4
We show ∆c = ∆d = ∆e if θ = 1. Substituting θ = 1 into ∆c(θ), ∆d(θ) and ∆e(θ), we obtain
∆c(1) = ∆d(1) = ∆e(1) =
a(1− b) + bs0 − c1
2− b2 = ∆˜(1).
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This implies Proposition 4(i).
Next, we show that V L0 ≥ V F0 , and the equality holds if and only if ∆1 = ∆d. From (20), we obtain
that V L0 ≥ V B0 , and the equality holds if and only if ∆1 = ∆˜. From (21), we obtain that V B0 = V F0
when θ = 1. ∆d = ∆˜ when θ = 1. These imply Proposition 4(ii).
In the proof of Proposition 3(iv), we do not use the condition θ < 1. Therefore, Proposition 3(iv)
holds when θ = 1. This implies Proposition 4(iii). ■
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